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ABSTRACT 
One of the arguments against deregulation of the airline industry has been the 
possibility that financially troubled carriers would be tempted to lower line 
maintenance spending, thus lowering maintenance quality and decreasing the overall 
safety of the carrier. Given the financial crisis triggered by the events of 9/11: it 
appears to be a good time to revisit this issue. This paper examines the quality of 
airline line maintenance activity and examines the impact of maintenance spending 
on maintenance quality and overall safety. Findings indicate that increased 
maintenance spending is associated with increased line maintenance activity and 
increased overall safety quality for the major U.S. carriers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the key concerns of opponents of airline deregulation in the U.S. 
was that once carriers were fiee to compete based on the price of their goods 
rather than on the quality of their service, the quality of their safety would 
decline as the pressure to reduce costs increased (Lee, 1996; Rose, 1992). 
The question of safety quality in the airline industry has provoked intense 
debate over issues as basic as the definition of safety quality itself and as 
complex as the relationship between safety and financial performance. In 
the wake of 9/11, there is not only renewed interest in airline safety quality, 
but concern that financially troubled carriers burdened with additional 
security expenses might be forced to reduce safety spending and line 
maintenance activity. The purpose of this research is to explore the role of 
maintenance spending and line maintenance activity in the production of 
airline safety quality. 
Background 
Prior to 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated both airline 
service quality and airline safety quality, establishing minimum standards for 
both. With the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, U.S. 
airlines were free to determine market entry and exit, flight frequency, 
aircraft type, capacity, aircraft configuration, and the level of amenities 
provided (e.g., meals, entertainment, and seat pitch), based on market forces. 
Establishing minimum standards and auditing for compliance is one of 
several ways to define and measure service quality. An airline survey such 
as those conducted by the publishers of Frequent Flyer and Conde Nast 
Traveler is another way. These surveys typically ask a cross-section of 
frequent flyers tu rank airtines on key issues of custoiiiei sziisfaction. 
Questions generally address the following ten factors of customer 
satisfaction: on-time performance, airport check-in, schedule/flight 
accommodations, seating comfort, gate location, aircraft interior, flight 
attendants, post-flight services, food services, and frequent flyer programs 
(Glab, 1998). While these surveys are an important source of information, it 
is difficult to compare the results of different surveys or to examine trends 
over time to gain a historical perspective of airline service quality. Aside 
from the quality awards created by the airlines themselves (e.g., the Grand 
Slam or Triple Crown), the most common method of defining and examining 
airline service quality is to use the results of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation’s (DOT) monthly publication, Air Travel Consumer Report. 
This publication contains information on flight delays, mishandled baggage, 
over-sold flights, and consumer complaints filed with the DOT. In 1991, the 
Aviation Institute at the University of Nebraska at Omaha began using this 
data in its Airline Qualify Rating (AQR) report (Bowen & Headley, 1991). 
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This report also includes key indicators of safety quality as well as financial 
stability. Unlike the survey method, the AQR and other studies using the 
data from the Air Travel Consumer Report have been criticized for focusing 
on basic service quality issues rather than the amenities (e.g., seating comfort 
and food service) that form a larger component of the typical survey 
(Perkins, 1998). The advantages of the Air Travel Consumer Report are its 
consistent historical reporting of data and public availability. 
While airlines were now free to determine their own level of service 
quality, safety continues to be regulated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). The FAA has authority to establish Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FARs) relating to: a) the design, manufacturing, and 
certification of aircraft, including their engines and other systems; b) the 
certification of airlines; and c) the certification of personnel who directly 
affect the safe operation of the aircraft, including pilots and mechanics. The 
National Aviation Safety Inspection Program was created to conduct focused 
inspections of airlines and maintenance facilities to insure compliance with 
all FARs. However, “there is also universal acknowledgement that full 
compliance with applicable safety regulation cannot be ascertained with 
existing or conventional methods of compliance surveillance” (Ozdener, 
2000). Researchers have variously defined safety quality in terms of fatal 
accidents, accident rate and/or incident rate. Proxy measures of safety 
quality include operating profit margin, maintenance expenditure, and 
inspection results (Barnett & Higgins, 1989; Kanafani & Keeler, 1989; Rose, 
1989; 1990; 1992). 
According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), there are four 
factors that affect the safe operation of airlines: a) financial stability, b) 
maintenance quality, c) management attitude, and d) pilot competence 
(GAO, 1988; 1996). While pilot competence and managerial attitude have 
been cited in antidotal reports of accident investigation, there is little 
empirical data examining this link. One company, Flightsafe Consultants 
Ltd., does attempt to assess management effort as it relates to safety, but the 
assessment is subjective and not available to the public (Pasztor & Michaels, 
2004). Research on the relationship between safety and overall financial 
performance has been mixed (Graham & Bowes, 1979; Kanafani & Keeler, 
1989; Lee, 1996; Moses & Savage, 1990; Rose, 1990;1992). The most 
commonly used measure of safety quality has been the level of maintenance 
expenditures, although this raw number can be misleading. Airline 
maintenance spending levels can be affected by a number of factors 
including the age of the aircraft in the fleet, the type and mix of aircraft, and 
the level of outsourcing (GAO, 1988; O’Toole, 1992). In short, to 
understand the issue of maintenance spending it is necessary to understand 
the nature of airline maintenance programs. 
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In an effort to maintain a comfortable degree of safety, a scheduled 
maintenance program is established for each transport category aircraft. For 
large aircraft, such a program is a process that can take up to five years to 
complete, and requires very close coordination between the aircraft 
manufacturer and operator (Hessburg, 200 1). 
The advent of modem scheduled maintenance programs began in the 
late 1960s with the Boeing 747. The sophistication and operating capabilities 
of the Boeing 747’s aircraft systems and engines reached a point where 
maintenance programs currently in place were no longer considered 
effective. The Air Transport Association (ATA) created a Maintenance 
Steering Group (MSG) consisting of representatives of ATA-member 
airlines. This group created a document that became known as MSG-1. 
MSG- 1 was process-and-procedures oriented. MSG- 1 was soon followed by 
MSG-2, which was used with both the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 and the 
Lockheed L- I O  1 1 aircraft. 
With the development of more sophisticated aircraft utilizing higher 
performance engines, glass cockpits, and advanced materials, the MSG-3 
was introduced. The MSG-3 is a task-oriented rather than process-and- 
procedure-oriented document. Originally intended for the Boeing 757 and 
767, MSG-3 has undergone three revisions, the latest including the Boeing 
777 (Friend, 1997; Hessburg, 200 1 ; Transportation Systems Consulting 
Corporation, 1999). 
The actual purpose of MSG-3 is to establish the methodology that will 
be used to prepare the maintenance plan for a particular aircraft. An Industry 
Steering Committee (ISC) and various working groups are then established 
to create the plan. The purpose of the ISC is to oversee the activities of the 
working groups, each of which are composed of specialists in the various 
systems such as avionics, mechanical systems, structures, engines, and flight 
controls (Hessburg, 2001). The working groups in turn determine 
Maintenance Specific Items (MSIs) and specific tasks for their inspection 
and maintenance (Friend, 1997). Close cooperation between the regulatory 
agencies, the manufacturer, and the airlines is essential throughout the 
process. 
The key to the process occurs early with a listing of the MSIs, that is, 
items that require specific inspections as determined by the appropriate 
specialists. After the list of MSIs has been determined, an analysis-known 
as decision tree logic-is performed on each item, with the key function 
being to differentiate between safety-related failure and economic failure. 
Servicing and maintenance requirements are determined at this time and 
include checks, inspections, lubrication, and when to discard. These 
requirements-known as tasks-are studied to the point where maintenance 
intervals can be defined in units of time called intervals. Intervals may 
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include hours, cycles, and calendars. The final product of the ISC and 
working groups are specific maintenance recommendations that include a list 
of items, tasks, and intervals. These recommendations are then presented to 
an FAA Maintenance Review Board that has approval authority, after which 
the necessary documents are developed (Hessburg, 200 I).  
The primary focus in aircraft maintenance, according to the FAA, is to 
provide continued airworthiness. Part 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) prescribes airworthiness standards for the issuance of type certificates 
for Transport Category aircraft. The essence of the FAA regulation is that 
the instructions for continued airworthiness for each aircraft must contain 
inspection and maintenance information for not only the airframe, but also 
for every part of the aircraft, for example, appliances, engines, and propellers 
Continued airworthiness data are typically in the form of manuals in paper, 
microfilm, microfiche, and/or CD-ROM format and organized in a specific 
manner. There will be general descriptions of the aircraft and its systems, 
basic operation of components and systems, servicing information regarding 
lubrication and capacities, troubleshooting information, methods of 
removing and replacing components, testing procedures, and specific details 
relating to inspections, maintenance, and servicing (FAA, 2003). Once the 
complete inspection package is developed, it is submitted to the FAA for 
approval. An FAA approved inspection program is then implemented as 
specified and takes the form of a number of different processes. 
AlRCRAFT INSPECTIONS 
For large aircraft, inspections fall into two broad categories: scheduled 
and special. Scheduled inspections include service checks, letter checks, 
phased checks, and calendar checks. The composition, scheduling, and even 
the titles of each inspection will vary with each operator. Regardless of the 
method used, the objectives behind such inspection programs are both safety 
and to increase aircraft availability. 
Special inspection programs are the other major category of inspections 
performed on transport category aircraft, and, essentially, supplement 
existing scheduled programs. Special inspection programs-often the result 
of new technology or accidentslincidents-are approved by the FAA and 
coordinated with the aircraft and/or engine manufacturer. Aging aircraft 
inspections, corrosion control programs, Extended Twin-Engine Operations, 
low aircraft utilization, and Global Position Systems for navigation, are all 
cases where special inspection programs are utilized (Hessburg, 200 1). 
Scheduled Inspections 
The most basic of the scheduled inspections is the service check. A 
service check includes checking and replenishing fluids, and inspecting for 
apparent deterioration, damage and security. These cursory inspections are 
Rhoades, Reynolds, Waguespack, and Williams 63 
made at certain times during an aircraft’s operating day. These inspections 
are made by line personnel, rather than by certificated technicians and are 
called, depending on their purpose, such names as preflight, throughflight, 
postflight, and overnight. Service checks are accomplished according to 
calendar time or flight hours depending on the requirements of the inspection 
program. 
The most widely known type of inspections are the A-D letter checks, 
with an A Check being the most basic and frequent, and a D Check being the 
most comprehensive. All of these checks are accomplished at specified 
maintenance stations with the lower checks being accomplished along the 
route structure and the higher checks at a major maintenance base. The 
detailed and idiosyncratic nature of an inspection program is such that some 
items, for example on a B Check, may be accomplished every second or 
third check rather then each time a B Check is performed. Letter checks, as 
well as all other approved inspection programs, are customized to both the 
aircraft as well as the operator. 
The A Check involves more detailed inspection than a service check, 
and focuses on servicing and periodic inspections of certain components on a 
daily basis. Some special tools and test equipment are required and the 
technicians performing them will have appropriate certifications. Fluid 
checks, system operations, and Built-in Test Equipment are all common with 
A Checks. A Checks typically occur twice per month, take 36 labor hours, 
and keep the aircraft out of service for approximately 12 hours (Hessburg, 
2001) The B Check, which is no longer employed in many inspection 
programs, involves more in-depth servicing and testing. When performed, a 
B Check will take up to a 40 hour labor week to complete, are accomplished 
every four months or so, and keep the aircraft out of service for up to 12 
consecutive scheduled flight hours (Hessburg, 200 1). Items formerly 
performed in this type of check have been incorporated into either A Checks 
or C Checks. 
The two remaining letter checks (C and D) are known as heavy checks 
and involve extensive inspection, testing, tools, and training. The C Check is 
the most common heavy check and is typically performed every 12 months 
or so. C Checks require approximately 450 labor hours and keep the aircraft 
out of service for as much as four days (Hessburg, 2001). Typical tasks 
performed during a C Check include detail visual inspections, specified 
systems hnctional testing, and major component lubrication. The most in- 
depth scheduled inspection is the D Check, which is predominately a major 
structural inspection designed to detect corrosion and fatigue failure through 
the use of sophisticated techniques such as Non-Destructive Testing. D 
Checks require as much as 1,500 labor hours and take a week or more to 
complete (Hessburg, 2001). Most operators have discontinued the D Check 
and have incorporated the various tasks into C Check intervals. An example 
64 Journal of Air Transportation 
would be to inspect wing attached bolts every eighth C Check (or 16,000 
flight hours). It is also important to note that each higher check includes all 
lower checks; for example, technicians performing a C Check would include 
items in both A Checks and B Checks as well as various service items. 
A common way to distribute items contained in the heavy checks is to 
utilize a phased inspection program. A phase check is where parts of C 
Checks and D Checks are incorporated into lower A Checks and B Checks. 
For example, an inspection item scheduled to be performed in a C Check 
(which is typically performed every year or approximately 1,600 flight 
hours), will be incorporated into a B Check. While it will lengthen the B 
Check by perhaps a few hours, it will still only need to be performed once 
per year and the next B Check will include another part of the C Check. 
Over the period of a year, each C Check item is completed only once and the 
aircraft will not be out of service for the typical four consecutive days 
required for a complete C Check. When establishing a scheduled 
maintenance plan, the MSG will essentially describe tasks and intervals. 
The actual packaging of the inspection program into logical groupings is 
determined by the operator. 
Service Difficulty Reports 
Under 14 CFR section 121.703 and 135.415 of Title 14 (Code of 
Federal Regulations available at www.gpoaaccess.gov/cfr/index.html) each 
holder of an airworthiness certificate must submit “reports on certain 
failures, malfunctions or defects of specific systems and on all other failures, 
malfunctions, or defects that, in the opinion of the certificate holder, have 
endangered or may endanger the safe operation of the aircraft.” These 
difficulties may be discovered during the course of operations, or during 
inspections. Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) are the publicly available 
record of line maintenance activity performed at repair stations, both those 
directly managed by the airline itself and outsource repair stations. This data 
are a key source of safety information for FAA inspectors as well as 
manufacturers interested in issues relating to the reliability and problems 
encountered with aircraft components. 
Regulations require certificate holders to report specifically on matter 
relating to: a) a fire or fire warning system, b) an engine exhaust system, c) 
any aircraft component that causes the circulation of smoke or harmful 
vapors, d) any engine flameout or shutdown, e) a propeller feathering 
system, f) a hel-dumping system, g) a landing gear system, h) a breaking 
system, i) any component or system that results in a rejected takeoff or 
emergency action, j )  any emergency evacuation system or component, and k) 
the autothrottle, autoflight or flight control system. 14 CFR section 12 1-704 
deals with reporting related to structural defects or failures. These reports 
must specify the nature of the problem and the action taken. They must also 
identify any precautionary or emergency measures (called procedures) taken 
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to address the problems in question citing the categories above for reference 
(Rohrbach, 2004). From a glance at the above categories and those listed 
below for reportable procedures, the safety implications behind such actions 
as engine shutdown or a failure in the landing gear should be reasonably 
clear. 
The reported data are entered and compiled into a database for weekly 
distribution to aircraft manufacturers, air carriers, repair stations, and the 
general aviation community. The raw data in the SDRs are available to the 
public through the FAA Web site (www.faa.gov) or other related Web sites 
such as www.landings.com. The FAA Aeronautical Center uses these 
reports to identify trends and significant safety issues. Based on this review 
of the database, the FAA may propose changes to existing procedures after 
due comment and may then issue an airworthiness directive or service 
bulletin. 
In this study, we examined SDR history for the major U.S. carriers in 
order to understand the relationship between this measure of line 
maintenance activity (quality), maintenance spending, and safety outcomes, 
namely the number of procedures reflected on the SDRs. The historical 
nature of the data on the SDRs, their public availability, and close link to 
safety-related problems in maintenance appear to make them an excellent 
proxy for safety-related maintenance activity. Specifically, we wished to 
determine whether maintenance spending does improve the quality of line 
maintenance activity as reflected in the SDRs. 
METHODS AND RESULTS 
Data on safety outcomes were gathered from the FAA safety databases 
on accidents, incidents, and near mid-air collision. These data and the 
annual number of departures per carrier are contained in work previously 
conducted by Rhoades and Waguespack (1999; 2000; 2001). Data on line 
maintenance activity were collected from the Web site www.landings.com, 
which obtains the publicly available information directly from the FAA. 
Information collected included the total number of yearly SDRs filed and the 
total number of procedures by category. The categories are: a) unscheduled 
landing, b) aborted takeoff, c) aborted landing, d) engine shutdown, e) 
emergency descent, f, return to blocks, and g) deployment of emergency 
oxygen and/or fire activation systems. lnformation on maintenance spending 
was gathered from the Air Carrier Financial Statistics Quarterly, compiled 
by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and published by the US. 
Department of Transportation. Information on the operational statistics 
(departures, miles, hours) was collected from the Air Currier Traffic 
Statistics Monthly and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. These data 
were used to normalize the safety and maintenance spending data for each 
carrier. 
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Table 1 shows the calculated figures for maintenance spending per mile 
flown for the carriers in this study. The last row on the table shows the mean 
maintenance spending per year. Spending rates below the industry mean are 
indicated. It should be noted that maintenance spending per year has 
increased for the industry overall between 1994 and 2000. 
Table 1. Maintenance spending per mile flown, for U.S. airlines, 1994-2000 
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Alaska .0009* .0008* .0008* .OOlO* .OOlO* .0012* .0015* 
AmericaWest .0008* .0009* .0009* .0012* ,0014' .0016* ,0018' 
American .0014* .0015 .0015 .0020 .0020 ,0019 .0021 
Continental .0017 .0014* .0014* .0015* .0016* .0016* .0016* 
Delta ,0015 .0014* .0013* .0014* .0015* .0016* .0018* 
Northwest .0017 .0018 ,0021 .0021 ,0025 ,0024 ,0029 
Southwest .OOlO* .OOlO* ,001 I *  .0010* ,001 I *  .0013* .0012* 
TWA ,0019 .0019 ,0021 ,0020 .0020 ,0020 .0020* 
United ,002 1 ,0022 .0022 .0022 ,0024 ,0024 ,0024 
USAir .OO 18 .0018 ,0019 .0021 .0023 .0022 ,0022 
Mean ,0015 .0015 .0015 ,0017 ,0018 .a018 .0020 
* Spending rate is below the industry annual mean 
Note: The raw data are from A i r  Currier Finunciul SIufrsrrcs Quur/er/y. 1994-2000, Washington 
DC: U.S. Department of Transportation Center for Transportation Information. 
Table 2 provides the ratio of procedures to total number of SDRs for 
these same carriers. If SDRs in general reflect the performance of routine 
maintenance, then-all other things being equal-a carrier performing more 
maintenance should demonstrate a higher level of maintenance quality, and 
thus a smaller number of procedures. A higher number of procedures, on the 
other hand, would not be a desirable outcome. We would expect the ratio of 
SDRs to procedures to be one indication of overall maintenance quality. In 
this case, Southwest stands out as being above the industry mean for 1994- 
1998, despite an excellent reputation for quality and an excellent record of 
safety. 
Analysis of the relationship between maintenance spending, SDRs, and 
safety quality reveals a number of interesting findings. There does not 
appear to be a significant correlation between maintenance spending per 
departure, mile or hour and the total number of SDRs filed each year by the 
major carriers. There was a small correlation (.362) between maintenance 
spending per average haul and total SDRs. This is to be expected for two 
reasons. First, A Checks and B Checks are performed whenever a flight 
lands or terminates; airlines with short average hauls (total miles divided by 
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departures) would be expected to perform more of these checks. Second, 
much of the wear and tear on an aircraft is the result of the pressure changes 
experienced during ascending and descending. Aircraft flying short hauls 
can be expected to experience more of this type of stress. 
Table 2. Ratio of reportable procedures to total service difficulty reports, for 
U.S. airlines, 1994-2000 
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Alaska 9.24 11.35 21.63 12.17 59.78 101.44 53.10 
America West 6.87 4.19 7.54 8.31 7.38 5.23 10.90 
American 4.96 4.96 10.71 5.14 13.01 7.93 7.81 
Continental 1.91 2.80 8.05 7.40 19.98 25.41 38.06 
Delta 14.55 12.39 6.31 4.76 8.08 4.53 3.40 
Northwest 3.41 3.08 5.82 3.90 3.64 5.44 3.85 
Southwest 14.73 8.80 12.82 9.61 20.96 10.95 13.05 
TWA 4.23 2.02 3.97 6.15 8.26 16.76 20.00 
United 2.71 1.82 3.12 2.75 1.97 1.96 2.07 
USAir 3.60 3.98 3.38 3.07 3.96 7.86 8.41 
Mean 6.62 5.54 8.34 6.33 14.70 18.75 16.06 
Note: The raw data on SDRs are collected from http://www.landings.com. 
These same maintenance rates do show a significant, moderate 
correlation (.273-.522) with the number of reported yearly procedures 
indicating that maintenance spending increases with the level of procedures 
experienced in a given year. It is unknown whether increasing levels of 
procedures generate more maintenance costs to carriers or whether carriers 
increase maintenance spending as a result of increasing levels of procedures. 
Examining the relationship between the ratio of procedures to SDRs and 
maintenance spending, we found a significant negative relationship (-.328), 
that is, as the level of maintenance spending increases then the ratio of 
procedures to SDRs declines. Maintenance spending was also negatively 
associated with the total safety rate, that is, as maintenance spending 
increases the number of safety problems per year decreases. 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis demonstrates that there is a relationship between 
maintenance spending rates and the level of both SDRs in line maintenance 
and the safety outcomes of the major carriers in the U.S. airline industry. As 
maintenance spending increased, carriers decrease the ratio of procedures to 
total SDRs. This is good news in several respects. Good routine 
maintenance appears to help lower the level of emergency and precautionary 
procedures. This in turn lowers the overall level of maintenance spending. 
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Increased maintenance spending also appears to decrease the number of 
safety problems experienced by airlines. This is the good news. As one 
articles recently stated, “[alircraft maintenance matters-a lot” (McCartney, 
2004). 
The bad news is that this relationship is not as simple as it would seem, 
nor does it appear to hold for all major carriers, leading to questions about 
the maintenance process itself. Southwest consistently posts a level of 
maintenance spending well below that of comparable major carriers and yet 
has an exceptional safety record. In part, this is due to the nature of their 
fleet which consists solely of B-737s. Maintaining a single aircraft fleet 
allows them to benefit from economies of scale in parts and equipment 
purchasing as well as lower training costs. United Air Lines, on the other 
hand, has posted a relatively high level of maintenance spending without any 
apparent improvement in safety outcomes. Of course, spending is not enough 
to guarantee safe outcomes nor can the total spending alone be used to judge 
maintenance quality since it is a function of fleet mix and age as well as the 
efficiency of the overall process and the stage at which potential safety 
problems are detected and corrected. Several recent articles have pointed to 
a key weakness in the maintenance field, namely FAA inspection. SDRs, 
while required of all repair stations, are covered under a fairly broad set of 
regulation. However, an effort by the FAA to tighten reporting to include a 
wider range of routine repairs and failures provoked an outcry from repair 
station operators (Rohrbach, 2004). Since reporting is and continues be 
subject to interpretation and individual carrier discretion, then active 
oversight of repair station operations is critical to ensure standards are met. 
Unfortunately, the FAA has been heavily criticized in recent years for its 
failure to provide adequate oversight, particularly of outsourced and foreign 
repair stations (McCartney, 2004; Pasztor, 2004; Alexander, Reed & 
Mellnik, 2003). 
No  study is without its limitations. In relying on SDRs, it is clearly 
possible that we have not fully captured the quality of line maintenance 
activity. The concept of quality in any area is a complex, multifaceted one. 
Maintenance quality is presumably a function of well-trained mechanics 
equipped with the proper tools and/or systems, utilizing parts that meet 
industry standards, and installing and maintaining them in ways proscribed 
by their manufacturer. However, these aspects of quality are not available to 
researchers. Data on the level of qualifications of the personnel hired by 
individual carriers are not available. Likewise, there is no source other than 
the airlines themselves (through voluntary reporting to researchers) of the 
level of corporate spending on training. Finally, as noted above, we must 
consider the accuracy of the SDRs themselves and the variation that exists 
between in-house and outsourced maintenance activities. 
1 
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Future research should address the impact of fleet mix and age on 
maintenance spending as well as the actual reporting process itself. Based 
on our review, there appears to be a good deal of variation both within and 
between carriers in the number and type of events reported. The relationship 
between maintenance quality, as reflected by SDRs and procedures should 
be examined to understand their relationship to direct safety outcomes such 
as accidents and incidents. Other issues that should be addressed include the 
effect of aircraft utilization and maintenance training on overall maintenance 
spending and safety quality. This study should also be extended to examine 
these relationships for national and regional carriers. 
Safety quality has been seen as an economic good that is both desired by 
consumers and costly to provide. Viewed in this context, “it no longer 
follows that the socially desirable level of safety is the highest that is both 
technologically and humanly possible,” (Ozdener, 2000, p. 18) since such a 
level would be prohibitively expensive. Even when a consensus can be 
reached on an acceptable level of safety, it is difficult to observe safety 
directly. Regulators, firms, and researchers have tended to observe safety 
outcomes such as accidents, incidents, and near mid-air collisions and relate 
these to safety inputs such as financial condition, maintenance spending, and 
training spending. This study is only one step in understanding the complex 
process of airline line maintenance activity. This process has come under 
increasing scrutiny in the last several years due to a series of high profile 
accidents (e.g., Alaska Airlines Flt 26 1 [2000], Flash Airlines Flt 504[2004]). 
While U.S. airlines continue to be some of the safest in the world, there is 
always room for improvement. Before this improvement can begin, it is 
necessary to develop a better understanding of the factors that affect 
maintenance quality and the processes that could be used to improve it. 
failures to adequately oversee airline safety, particularly maintenance 
practices. Unfortunately, “outside groups and academics have made limited 
efforts to fill the gap” (Pasztor & Michaels, 2004, p. A14). This paper is one 
attempt to f i l l  this very large gap. A gap we believe must be filled in order 
to provide consumers with the safety they expect and deserve. 
IT,.+:,.. xarlvllal and international organizations have been criticized for their 
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